


**AIRPROX REPORT No 2017155**

Date: 06 Jul 2017 Time: 1108Z Position: 5138N 00047W Location: Wycombe Air Park

**PART A: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION REPORTED TO UKAB**

Recorded	Aircraft 1	Aircraft 2
Aircraft	C152	Chilton
Operator	Civ Trg	Civ Pte
Airspace		
Class	G	G
Rules	VFR	VFR
Service	Aerodrome	
Provider	Wycombe	
Altitude/FL	1200ft	
Transponder	A, C, S	
<b>Reported</b>		
Colours	Blue, Red	
Lighting	Landing	
Conditions	VMC	VMC
Visibility	25km	
Altitude/FL	300ft	
Altimeter	QFE (996hPa)	
Heading	020°	
Speed	65kt	
ACAS/TAS	Not fitted	
<b>Separation</b>		
Reported	0ft V/100m H	
Recorded	NK	



**THE C152 PILOT** reports he was in the RW06 circuit, with a student at the controls. They had just completed their third touch-and-go and were following the noise abatement pattern when the instructor spotted the other aircraft to their right, at a similar height and travelling in the opposite direction. He monitored it for a few seconds but it quickly became clear that it was on a collision course so he took control and executed a hard left turn to avoid it. The other aircraft flew close enough to be able to see its colour and pick out letters in the registration number. He immediately informed Wycombe ATC to warn traffic on climb-out behind him. ATC confirmed that they were not talking to him on the RT. The aircraft appeared to continue on its path, with no changes to heading over High Wycombe.

He assessed the risk of collision as 'High'.

**THE CHILTON PILOT** did not file a report, but in a telephone conversation he stated that he was on a cross-country flight and saw the C152 cross his path from left to right on the edge of the 'Booker zone'. He had it in sight for the whole time and there was no danger of collision.

**THE WYCOMBE CONTROLLER** reports that the C152 pilot reported an Airprox with an unknown aircraft whilst on climb-out from RW06. The Airprox occurred inside the Wycombe ATZ and the other aircraft was not talking to ATC.

**Factual Background**

The weather at Wycombe was recorded as follows:

EGLL 061050Z AUTO 12009KT 090V160 9999 NCD 28/14 Q1014 NOSIG=

## Analysis and Investigation

### CAA ATSI

The Airprox was reported by the C152 pilot as a result of the aircraft coming into proximity with an unknown aircraft whilst in the RW06 visual circuit at Wycombe Air Park. The C152 was in receipt of an Aerodrome Control Service from Wycombe ATC at the time of the Airprox and had been conducting a number of VFR circuits prior to the incident. The conflicting aircraft was not receiving a service from Wycombe ATC and was not observed by the Wycombe ATCO.

At 1101:58 the C152 was observed on the radar replay to be crosswind. At this point, a primary-only radar contact was observed inside the visual circuit just to the north/north west of the Airfield (Figure 1). This primary-only radar contact faded in and out of radar cover and it was not possible to continuously track the aircraft on radar. However, it was established from the R/T recording that glider operations and helicopter activity were taking place to the north of RW06 at this time.

At 1103:39, another primary-only radar contact appeared upwind of the climb out lane for RW06 (Figure 2). This radar contact faded from radar cover almost immediately.



Figure 1 - 1101:58  
(primary-only radar contacts outlined in red)




Figure 2 - 1103:39

The Airprox reportedly occurred at 1108:00 when the C152 was crosswind (Figure 3). At this time there were no primary-only radar contacts displayed on the radar replay.




Figure 3 - 1108:00




Figure 4 - 1109:57

At 1109:57 a primary-only radar contact displayed on radar replay to the south of Wycombe tracking south and eventually faded from radar cover to the west of White Waltham (Figure 4). Attempts were made by Wycombe ATC to trace the aircraft but these attempts were unsuccessful and it was not possible to confirm the identity of the reported conflicting aircraft at the time.

At the time of the Airprox, the Wycombe ATCO was providing an Aerodrome Control Service and was unaware of the presence of the conflicting aircraft. The responsibility for collision avoidance remained with the pilots.

### **UKAB Secretariat**

The C152 and Chilton pilots shared an equal responsibility for collision avoidance and not to operate in such proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard<sup>1</sup>. An aircraft operated on or in the vicinity of an aerodrome shall conform with or avoid the pattern of traffic formed by other aircraft in operation<sup>2</sup>.

### **Comments**

#### **C152 operating Authority**

The pilot reported his intent to report an Airprox to Wycombe ATC in person in the first instance, and subsequently internal SMS reports were received from both the pilot and the Duty ATCO.

### **Summary**

An Airprox was reported when a C152 and a Chilton flew into proximity at 1108 on Thursday 6<sup>th</sup> July 2017. Both pilots were operating under VFR in VMC, the C152 pilot in receipt of an Aerodrome Service from Wycombe Air Park and the Chilton pilot was not in receipt of an ATS.

### **PART B: SUMMARY OF THE BOARD'S DISCUSSIONS**

Information available consisted of reports from the pilots of both aircraft, radar photographs/video recordings, reports from the air traffic controllers involved and reports from the appropriate ATC and operating authorities.

The Board first looked at the actions of the C152 pilot. He was operating in the Wycombe ATZ and, as such, was not expecting to see another aircraft in his vicinity. Members were informed that the noise abatement procedures in place at Wycombe Air Park take the visual circuit close to the edge of the ATZ, and those with experience of flying there noted that the procedures placed a high cockpit workload on pilots to ensure that the circuit track was accurately followed. Upon seeing the other aircraft in proximity, the C152 instructor took control to take avoiding action and alerted the other aircraft in the circuit to an aircraft in the ATZ. However, ATC did not report seeing the Chilton, and the Board thought it likely that they reported it as inside the ATZ because that was where the C152 pilot reported it to be.

For his part, members noted that the Chilton pilot had not supplied a full report to the UKAB (although he had engaged in a telephone conversation with one of the Inspectors), therefore some of the facts were not available to the Board. Although the pilot described seeing the C152 crossing left to right, members thought it likely that the relative geometry coupled with the avoiding action taken by the C152 pilot would make it appear that it was crossing as the C152 pilot turned to avoid, even if the two aircraft were initially almost on opposing headings. Unfortunately, without a report of the Chilton's heading it was difficult to be sure because the Chilton did not present on the NATS radars and so his exact track was not available to the Board. Members noted that the Chilton pilot reported being

<sup>1</sup> SERA.3205 Proximity.

<sup>2</sup> SERA.3225 Operation on and in the Vicinity of an Aerodrome.

outside the Wycombe ATZ, whilst the C152 reported that he was inside the ATZ. Unfortunately, because of the lack of corroborating information, the Board could not determine the Chilton's location either way. Nevertheless, even if just outside the ATZ, members thought it would have been better airmanship to have either given Wycombe ATC a call as he was passing by (if he had a radio), or have given the ATZ a wider berth in any case.

Turning to the cause and risk, the Board noted that the Chilton pilot had commented that he had seen the C152 throughout but they returned to the fact that they could not come to a positive conclusion about whether the Chilton was inside or outside the ATZ. As a result, they decided that the incident was probably best described as the C152 pilot being concerned by the proximity of the Chilton. However, the determination of risk was more problematic. Some members thought that this was a close encounter only averted by the C152 taking the hard left turn to avoid the Chilton and should be assessed as risk category B (safety much reduced below the norm). Others thought that without firm evidence of the Chilton's position there was not enough information available to assess the risk given that one pilot had assessed the risk as high and the other as none. In the end, the latter view prevailed and, regrettably, the Board attributed risk Category D, insufficient evidence, to the event.

### **PART C: ASSESSMENT OF CAUSE AND RISK**

Cause: The C152 pilot was concerned by the proximity of the Chilton.

Degree of Risk: D.

#### Safety Barrier Assessment<sup>3</sup>

In assessing the effectiveness of the safety barriers associated with this incident, the Board concluded that the key factors had been that:

#### **ANSP**

**Situational Awareness & Action** was assessed as ineffective because Wycombe ATC were not speaking to the Chilton pilot and therefore had no knowledge that he was there.

#### **Flight Crew**

**Regulations, Processes, Procedures, Instructions & Compliance** were unable to be assessed because it was not known whether the Chilton pilot was inside, or outside the Wycombe ATZ.

**Tactical Planning** was assessed as partially effective because the Chilton pilot could have given Wycombe ATC a call to let them know he was transiting close by if he had a radio, and could have planned to avoid the ATZ by a greater margin.

**Situational Awareness & Action** was assessed as ineffective because the C152 pilot did not know the Chilton pilot was in the vicinity, and if the Chilton pilot was aware of the C152 as he stated he did not take sufficient action to avoid it.

**Warning System Operation and Compliance** was assessed as not present because the C152 was not fitted with a CWS and the Chilton was not transponder equipped.

**See and Avoid** was assessed as fully effective because both pilots saw each other with enough time to take action, (or decide that no action was necessary).

See overleaf for the Safety Barrier Assessment depiction.

<sup>3</sup> The UK Airprox Board scheme for assessing the Availability, Functionality and Effectiveness of safety barriers can be found on the [UKAB Website](#).

